Milena Ang

Collegiate Assistant Professor, Social Sciences
Core: Social Science Inquiry

Gates-Blake 333
773.702.7992

Milena Ang received her doctorate from the University of Chicago, department of Political Science. Her book manuscript questions the assumption that democratic institutions improve judicial accountability of corrupt politicians. Using a game theoretical approach, she argues that incumbents in democracies are more likely to prosecute their challengers than autocrats. Contrary to what existing research has suggested, however, this can be attributed to the fact that democracies constrain executives in their use of extra-legal---and coercive---means to curb opposition, and not necessarily because democracies increase oversight of those in power. These theoretical implications are tested with an original dataset of judicial investigations of Mexican governors that exploits temporal and geographical variation of regime type at the subnational level. The evidence of politicized use of prosecution among governors in Mexico supports the formal model, suggesting that prosecuting corrupt politicians is always an instance of accountability. Milena also has an active research agenda in quantitative methodology, especially in the applications of hierarchical or multilevel models in comparative politics. Before coming to Chicago, Milena earned a BA in Political Science from CIDE in Mexico city.